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Abstract
Recent evidence has established that non-cognitive skills are key determinants of education
and labor outcomes. However, little is known about the mechanisms producing these
results. This paper tests a channel that could explain part of the association between some
non-cognitive characteristics and educational attainment: teachers’ assessment practices
that unequally evaluate students on the basis of their classroom behavior rather than
their scholastic competence. Evidence is drawn from unique data on middle- and high-
school students in Brazilian private schools. Our main empirical strategy is based on
the contrasting of teacher-assigned and blindly-assigned scores on achievement tests that
are high-stakes and cover the same material. Using detailed data on student classroom
behaviors and holding constant performance in exams graded blindly, evidence indicates
that teachers inflate test scores of better-behaved students, and deduct points from worse-
behaved ones. We also find that, conditional on end-of-year grade, teachers’ decision to
approve pupils that are bellow the passing cutoff grade is influenced by how these students
behaved in class. Back of the envelope calculations suggest that this grading behavior may
significantly change the proportion of students failing the school year depending on their
classroom attitudes.
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Researchers have emphasized that socially productive skills include not only traditionally studied
cognitive abilities, but also behavioral and socio-emotional factors such as perseverance, self-
control, and prosociality. In recent years, numerous studies have documented the central role
played by these noncognitive skills in shaping educational attainment and adult outcomes (Segal,
2013; Heckman et al., 2006; Papageorge et al., 2019; Deming, 2017; Kautz and Zanoni, 2014;
Heckman et al., 2014).1 Importantly from a policy standpoint, there is also ample evidence
suggesting that these skills are malleable, and can be influenced by school and teacher quality,
home environment, and educational interventions (Jackson, 2018; Bertrand and Pan, 2013;
Heckman et al., 2013; Jackson et al., 2020; Alan et al., 2019). However, despite the importance of
socio-emotional factors, and significant advances in understanding its causes and consequences,
there is still limited empirical evidence on how they affect important outcomes.
In the present study, we propose teachers’ assessment practices as a potential mediator for
gaps in attainment between students with different non-cognitive characteristics. We examine its
prevalence by testing whether teachers unequally assess students on the basis of their classroom
behavior rather than their scholastic competence.2 The paper employs a unique administrative
data from an educational company that manages more than one hundred private schools in Brazil.
We use teachers’ reports on their students’ behavior to construct measures of good and bad
in-class behaviors. Our main empirical strategy is based on the contrasting of teacher-assigned
and blindly-assigned scores on achievement examinations that are high-stakes and designed to
measure students’ mastery of the same material. We also study teachers’ discretion on whether
to approve students with an end-of-year grade below the passing threshold and estimate if this
is another high-stakes decision influenced by student classroom behavior. To do so, we compare
students with the same final grade but with different behavioral characteristics.
We show that students’ in-class behaviors substantially affect their scores in teacher-graded
achievement examinations, even conditional on proficiency on the material required by the test.
Good behavior produces a math test score bonus of 0.11 SD, and bad behavior a deduction of
0.14 SD. These estimates explain 20 and 40 percent of the unconditional correlation between
good and bad behavior and test scores, respectively. These results are robust to a series of
potential problems. To deal with the incidence of measurement error on the blind test scores
used as regressors, we use lagged scores as an instrument for the current ones. We show that
if the exogeneity condition of the instrument does not hold, our parameters of interest are
1For surveys, see Almlund et al. (2011), Heckman and Kautz (2012), and Heckman et al. (2019).
2We interpret classroom behaviors as narrower manifestations of personality characteristics. Several recent
papers use observable behaviors from administrative data to measure non-cognitive skills and demonstrate this
as a promising approach (Heckman et al., 2019). Some of them have used classroom behaviors based on teacher
reports like we do (Segal, 2013; Papageorge et al., 2019; Heckman et al., 2013). Schooling behaviors have also
been associated with traditional non-cognitive skills such as patience (Alan and Ertac, 2018; Castillo et al., 2011;
Sutter et al., 2013), self-control (Duckworth and Seligman, 2005), and conscientiousness more generally (Segal,
2008). Moreover, Spengler et al. (2018) show that schooling behaviors have similar or even more significant
predictive power of long-term outcomes than well-known psychometric measures of non-cognitive skills. Finally,
Farrington et al. (2012) advocate that schooling behaviors are the main channel through which most traditional
non-cognitive skills affect educational outcomes.
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bounded by OLS and IV estimators under a few additional assumptions. A placebo test that
uses as outcome blindly assigned scores on tests with the same format from the teacher-graded
ones indicates that potential differences between blind and non-blind exams do not explain
the pattern of our results. Also, exploiting blindly-assigned essay scores, we find no evidence
supporting that our results are explained by potential biases from math teachers toward student
handwriting skills. Our results are also robust to other confounders that may lead to grading
bias, including gender and race. Moreover, we find much stronger grading bias due to in-class
behavior than for these other features. Our results also remain similar if instead of using
the behavior reports from the same teacher that assign math test scores, we use the behavior
assessments from current teachers from other subjects or assessments made in the previous year,
by teachers that currently do not even teach the students. Finally, teachers’ grading behavior
does not appear to be consistent with potential interpretations of statistical discrimination
models: our results are more pronounced in classes where the correlation between ability and
behavior is low; they are also stable throughout the year and across evaluations with different
subjectivity levels. Taken together, our results suggest that students’ behavioral characteristics
directly affect teachers’ assessment of their cognitive performance on achievement tests.
Consistent with the evidence on grading biases, we also find that, conditional on course
grades, teachers decide whether or not to approve students below the official passing threshold
based on how they behaved in class during the year. The well-behaved ones are in a higher
proportion approved without having to take a reassessment examination. The opposite is
true for the ill-behaved; in particular, those close to the passing threshold have a 20% higher
chance of going through a reassessment phase instead of being approved directly by teachers.
These results are robust to the omission of unobservable student characteristics that could also
influence teachers’ decision (Oster, 2019). Finally, using our main estimates to correct teachers’
grading biases toward behavior, we find that the proportion of students who fail in the school
year would be significantly different under counterfactual grading scenarios.
This paper provides quantitative evidence that teachers are not neutral to students’
behavioral characteristics when assessing their current achievement and taking high-stakes
decisions based on that. This grading behavior may be socially desirable if it induces a student
to behave more positively, generating private benefits to the pupil and positive externalities to
peers (Golsteyn et al., 2021). However, this practice is expressly prohibited by our partner’s
official guideline. This follows long-standing recommendations by specialists on classroom
assessment, which explicitly warn against the adjustment of test scores to reflect students’
attitudes and behaviors. (McMillan, 2013).3 Moreover, there are two subjective grades in our
setting that teachers may factor in their pupils’ behavior. Hence, if teachers wanted to simply
induce good behavior through grades, it would be more efficient to use these marks. These
grades, however, have very low variability. Hence, consciously or not, teachers seem to use
non-official channels to punish (reward) undesired (desired) behavior. This result is relevant to
the understanding of educational gaps between students with different behavioral characteristics.
395% of the school administrators studied by Johnson et al. (2008) judged this practice as unethical.
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Given the long-term consequences of grade retention (Manacorda, 2012; Eren et al., 2018) and
inaccurate test scores (Terrier, 2016; Diamond and Persson, 2016; Lavy and Sand, 2018; Lavy
and Megalokonomou, 2019; Dee et al., 2019; Nordin et al., 2019), our results may also suggest a
potential mechanism for the relation between non-cognitive factors and other important life
outcomes.
Our findings contribute to the literature highlighting the importance of non-cognitive
skills. Little is known about the mechanisms behind the association between socio-emotional
factors and educational and labor outcomes. Researches often speculate that non-cognitive
characteristics induce productive habits which result in better life outcomes.4 Evidence on
that channel is mixed, depending on the skill being evaluated. While Lavecchia et al. (2016)
show that impatient students report spending less time doing homework, other papers find that
impatient students do not have lower study effort, even though they have much worse test scores
(De Paola and Gioia, 2017; Non and Tempelaar, 2016). Outside the economics literature, a
few papers show that personality traits are correlated with study habits (Lubbers et al., 2010;
Credé and Kuncel, 2008). A related explanation is that non-cognitive characteristics may affect
the effort put during tasks to obtain good results. Evidence by Borghans et al. (2008) support
this explanation. The authors show that individuals with high non-cognitive skills operate a
low-stakes cognitive test at a high level, even without rewards (see Segal (2012) for a related
result). Similarly, Cubel et al. (2016) show that personality traits predict performance in an
experimental task that requires real effort. The authors argue that this finding suggests that at
least part of the effect of personality on labor market outcomes operates through productivity.
Overall, the few evidence suggesting mediators for the association between non-cognitive skills
and other outcomes are based on partial correlations and come from small-sample studies
analyzing experimental outcomes. In our study, we analyze a significant number of students and
make use of a quasi-experimental research design to provide evidence on a different mechanism –
teachers’ assessment practices – behind the relation between non-cognitive characteristics and
schooling outcomes.
This paper is also closely related to the recent literature on teacher discrimination in
grading. Some previous papers compare non-blindly- and blindly-assigned marks across minority
and non-minority students (Botelho et al., 2015; Burgess and Greaves, 2013; Hanna and Linden,
2012; Alesina et al., 2018) and genders (Lavy, 2008; Hinnerich et al., 2011; Falch and Naper, 2013;
Cornwell et al., 2013; Breda and Ly, 2015), and establish that grading discrimination exists in
those dimensions. Besides ethnic and gender indicators, classroom behavior is another relevant
student characteristic available to teachers during in-class interactions that may impact their
judgment when grading. Mechtenberg (2009) refers to the behaviors as attitudes, which include
4Segal (2013) theorizes a similar channel. Her empirical results provide evidence that childhood misbehavior
is negatively correlated with educational attainment and labor market outcomes. Based on the results of Castillo
et al. (2011) – which find that pupils with higher discount rates have more behavioral problems in school – she
develops a model to interpret the mechanisms driving her results. In her model, individuals are endowed with
both cognitive and non-cognitive human capital. They can enhance their cognitive human capital at each level
of schooling by exerting costly effort. Those who value the future less (i.e., those with low non-cognitive skills)
invest less effort in school and hence accumulate less cognitive human capital; as a result, they earn less.
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students’ personality traits and habits that may change teachers’ grading behavior depending
on whether they like or dislike these attitudes. We contribute to the literature by testing this
hypothesis in detail. Previous papers recognize that classroom behavior may be one of the most
critical cofounders in grading discrimination estimates. Hence, a few of them try to adjust
for proxies of behavior.5 Similar to those papers, we also find grading discrimination toward
ethnicity and gender. However, in this article, we use a unique dataset on objective indicators
of student positive and negative in-class behaviors to show that, irrespective of ethnicity and
gender, teachers score students’ cognitive skills differently depending on how they behave in
class. Moreover, we show that, besides the grading of examinations, there are other educational
evaluation steps in which teachers make achievement assessments based on non-achievement
characteristics.
Despite being one of the first studies to examine grading biases toward pupil behaviors
in detail, we are well aware that the question of whether teachers factor the behavior of
students into achievement assessments and grades is not new to the education and psychology
literature. Previous research from education highlights that teacher assessments of student
academic ability are central to school decisions, including instructional planning, screening,
placement, referrals, and communication with parents. They can also directly influence study
patterns, self-perceptions, and motivation to learn (Brookhart, 1997; Rodriguez, 2004). Even so,
researchers working with classroom assessments have been warning about the unreliability of
marks attached to pupils’ work for a long time (Starch and Elliott, 1912, 1913). Many teachers
misestimate students’ abilities and misinterpret their performance in summative tests; frequently,
they arrive at their assessment through idiosyncratic methods (Kilday et al., 2012). These
tendencies may allow teachers to pull for students who deserve better grades or adjust scores
down for students with poor behavior (Wyatt-Smith et al., 2010; Harlen, 2005). As far as we
know, quantitative education researchers have not formally tested this hypothesis. Similar to
the economics literature, they have focused on issues related to gender and race (Wen, 1979;
Piché et al., 1977; Roen, 1992). This paper tries to fill this gap.
Research in psychology has studied the effects of socio-emotional and behavioral factors
on test scores and grades extensively. Several studies from the seventies and eighties show
that student temperament in the classroom strongly predicts teacher-assigned grades (Keogh,
1986). More recently, researches in psychology have evaluated the predictive power of student
personality characteristics on grades and standardized achievement test scores (Almlund et al.,
2011; Duckworth and Allred, 2012). An important finding from this literature is that, among
the Big Five, conscientiousness – traditionally associated with student classroom behaviors
5Lavy (2008) adjusts for past grades under the hypothesis that those should be correlated with students’ past
behavior in the classroom, which should be correlated with the students’ current behavior. Botelho et al. (2015)
also use previous grades as well as several other variables. Among them, physical education grades, attendance
records, and the perception of parents regarding their children’s engagement at school. Cornwell et al. (2013)
controls for “attitudes toward learning”, which are based on teacher reports. Alesina et al. (2018) use a subjective
grade decided jointly by all the teachers. Terrier (2016) uses a variable of disruptive behavior that equals one if
the student received a disciplinary warning from the class council or if he/she was temporarily excluded from
the school by the school head because of violent behavior.
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(Segal, 2008) – is the most predictive skill of both course grades and test scores. However, a few
papers show that some facets of conscientiousness seem to be better predictors of course grades
than of achievement scores. Following our previous discussion, researchers argue that this may
be the result of those abilities inducing more positive study habits, which translate into higher
course grades. As achievement tests require the students to solve relatively novel problems, its
scores may not reflect study habits as much as school-level works (Almlund et al., 2011).6 Such
a difference may also be the result of the influence of non-cognitive skills on the amount of effort
that a test taker exerts in examinations with low stakes such as some standardized achievement
tests (Heckman et al., 2019). Finally, it is also speculated that some socio-emotional factors may
help students to behave positively in the classroom, which could be directly factored into course
grades by teachers (Duckworth et al., 2012). In this article, instead of studying course grades
and low-stakes standardized tests, we compare teacher-assigned and blindly-assigned scores
from high-stakes achievement exams covering the same material. In our setting, study habits
and effort should impact both types of evaluations similarly. Our study adds to this literature
by providing empirical evidence that teachers rate students’ competence in achievement tests
differently whether they behaved positively or negatively in the class. As course grades are a
direct function of these cognitive assessments, we suggest another reason why non-cognitive
skills are important predictors for grades.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and presents our behavior
measures. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and main results on the grading biases
toward student behavior. Section 4 presents robustness and heterogeneous analyses. Section 5
estimates whether approval decisions are based on student behavior. Section 6 simulates grade
retention rates across students with different classroom behaviors under counterfactual grading
scenarios. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Background and Data
We employ administrative data from a Brazilian private education company. The company
manages more than one hundred private schools located in the South, Southeast, and Center-
West of Brazil. Enrollment corresponded to more than eighty thousand primary, middle,
and high-school pupils in 2018. To examine teacher assessment biases, we take advantage of
administrative dataset that contains students’ scores on tests graded blindly and non-blindly.
We now describe the schools’ setting for students from middle school (grades 6-9) and
from the first two years of high school (grades 10-11).7 Schools operate a two-term school year
(first and second semester). Each term is divided into three cycles. Students perform, per each
6Related to this channel, Borghans et al. (2016) find that IQ is a better predictor of SAT scores than of
course grades.
7Appendix Figure A.1 complements this section by highlighting the main elements of our setting visually.
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cycle, a “multidisciplinary exam” (ME) and a “specific exam” (SE). Both types of tests are
high-stakes and do factor into the pupils’ end-of-term average score. Scores from SEs are worth
60%, while the scores from MEs are worth 30%. Students also earn a subjective grade based on
their behavior on in- and extra-class activities, which factors 10% into the end-of-term average
score.
MEs test knowledge on four topics: mathematics, language (English and Portuguese),
science (physics, biology, and chemistry), and humanities (geography and history). All the
questions from these exams are multiple-choice and corrected by a computer. The scores students
obtain from these exams, which we call blind scores, can be assumed to be free of any bias
caused by stereotypes from examiners. SEs are specific to each subject. Most of these exams are
a mix of multiple-choice and questions requiring written answers, and are graded by teachers.
By the schools’ rules, teachers’ grading should be only based on the students’ proficiency in
the exam-specific subject. Still, teachers may have considerable arbitrariness when assigning
grades. In that case, such scores, which we call non-blind scores, may be biased because of
student behavior. In most of the schools, the third and the sixth SEs are only multiple-choice
and also corrected by a computer. Additionally, in most of schools, students perform essays
graded blindly by an external team. However, these essays are usually non high-stakes.
Both types of examination we described are created by the schools’ pedagogical team,
based on a bank of questions. They are designed to measure students’ mastery of the material
delivered within each cycle. Both tests are also taken under the same conditions: they take
place in the students’ classroom and are supervised by inspectors, which are also responsible
for giving general instructions. Depending on the school, the SE may be scheduled before or
after the ME. The major difference between the tests is that the ME usually cover different
subjects, while the SE exam is subject-specific. The exceptions are math and essay. As we aim
to contrast blindly and non-blindly graded high-stakes examinations on the same subject, we
will focus mostly on math scores. Still, we test for grading biases in other subjects as well.
To monitor students’ behavior, our partner developed a platform where teachers must
report on a regular basis their pupils’ classroom behavior at some classes. Teachers must mark
at least one of the following options when assessing their students’ behavior: “dedication”, “good
interaction with classmates”, “participation during the class”, “excessive talking”, “cellphone
use”, “disinterest during the class”, or “did not complete the required tasks”.
The dataset used in this study pertains to the school year 2019 and contains all the blind
and non-blind scores of the students from middle school (grades 6-9) and the first two years of
high-school (grades 10-11). We select these students as before grade 6, pupils do not perform
blindly-graded exams. Also, in the last year of high-school (grade 12), students do not perform
teacher-assigned scores. We also have access to the dataset coming from the schools’ online
system, which contains all the behavior assessments teachers made in 2019 and 2018. We discuss
next how we use these reports to construct behavior measures. Finally, our data also contain
some major student characteristics: ethnicity, gender, and age.
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2.2 Behavior Measures
In order to estimate both a potential discrimination against badly behaved students, as well as
a potential favoritism toward the best behaved ones, we propose and compute two behavior
measures. To do so, we start classifying the behavior reports into good and bad assessments.
In particular, “dedication”, “good interaction with classmates”, and “participation during the
class” are classified as an assessment of good behavior. Now, “excessive talking”, “cellphone
use”, “disinterest during the class”, and “did not complete the required tasks” are classified as
an assessment of bad behavior.
Based on this classification, we construct measures of good and bad classroom behavior
defined on the interval [0, 1] for each student and each subject. The measure of good (bad)
behavior weights the number of good (bad) assessments a student received from his/her teacher
of a specific subject by the maximum number of good (bad) evaluations received by a classmate
from that same teacher. These measures are formally defined as follows. Let I denote the set
of all students. For any i ∈ I, define C(i) ⊂ I as the set of students in the same classroom of
pupil i, including himself/herself. Let bijs and gijs denote the number of bad and good behavior
reports received by i until exam j from a subject s teacher. The good and the bad behavior
measures are defined, respectively, as:
GBijs :=
gijs





max{bhjs : h ∈ C(i)}
.
Notice that the good (bad) behavior measure from subject s is not defined for pupils in
classrooms where ghjs = 0 (bhjs = 0) for all h ∈ C(i). These classrooms are discarded from our
final sample. However, the GB (BB) measure is well defined for pupils with no good (bad)
behavior assessments in a specific subject provided they belong to classrooms where at least
one of their classmates received such an assessment. In that case, GBijs = 0 (BBijs = 0).
These students can be understood as “neutral” with respect to the respective behavior measure.
In robustness checks, we also test alternative ways of using the behavior reports: we use the
behavior reports made by teachers from subjects other than s and by teacher from the previous
year, currently not teaching the students.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our sample. The data cover 23,000 students from
grades 6-11 in 738 classrooms and 80 schools. At least 58% of the sample is white, 24% is Pardo,
3% is black, and 1% is yellow or indigenous. A large share of parents (15%) did not provide
their children’s ethnicity. The gender split is roughly even. The average age is fourteen years
old and 5% of the students are at least two years late in relation to the official age for their
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current grade.
In 98% and 99% of the classrooms, there are students with at least one bad and good
behavior assessment, respectively. This share is lower if we consider only reports made by math
teachers: 81% and 84%. Students received more positive than negative assessments. Indeed, they
earned, on average, 44 assessments of good behavior and 12 of bad behavior. Of these, 10 and 3
came from math teachers. Moreover, considering all teachers’ behavior reports, the students’
average score in the good behavior measure is 0.53, while it is 0.29 in the bad behavior measure.
The average score is similar if we only use the reports from math teachers. Appendix A presents
additional statistics for the behavior data. Appendix Figure A.2 plots the empirical CDF of the
behavior measures. The bad and the good behavior measures computed using the assessments
from all teachers assume value zero for 17% and 1% of the students, respectively. The share of
neutral students is higher if we consider only the assessments from math teachers – 35% and
10%, respectively. Appendix Figure A.3 plots the empirical CDFs by student demographics.
Boys and over-aged students receive more negative behavior assessments and fewer positive
behavior assessments. There is no clear association between ethnicity and in-class behaviors.
Finally, Appendix Figure A.4 plots the association between the behavior measures and the
subjective grades, which teachers may factor in their pupils’ in- and extra-class behaviors. While
it is clear that students getting the lowest subjective grades are also scoring high (low) in the
BB (GB) measure, these grades have very low variability. Our goal in this papers is thus to
evaluate whether teachers use non-official channels to reward or punish in-class behaviors.
Figure 1 displays the performance gap in teacher-graded achievement math tests between
students with different behavior skills. Students at the top quartile of the GB measure dis-
tribution (GB(Pct.75) = 1) outperform those at the bottom across the entire achievement
distribution (panel a). The opposite is true for students at the bottom quartile of the BB
measure distribution (panel b). As teachers may have considerable arbitrariness when assigning
grades, they may bias these cognitive assessments depending on whether they like or dislike
the in-class behaviors of the students. To test whether this mechanism explains part of the
achievement-gap depicted earlier, we will use blindly-assigned scores from exams covering the
same material of the teacher-graded ones as the counterfactual test scores students would earn if
there were no grading biases. Figure 2 plots the association between blind and non-blind math
scores after we took their average across all the examinations. Both test scores are significantly
correlated. One standard deviation (SD) increase in the blind scores is associated with increased
teacher-assigned scores of 0.81 SD. Moreover, a linear model of the teacher-assigned test scores
on the blindly-assigned ones explains 60% of the non-blind scores’ variation. These numbers are
expressive, especially if we consider test score measurement error. This is explored directly in
the next sections.
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3 Estimating grading biases toward student behavior
3.1 Empirical Strategy
We are interested in estimating a parameter of grading discrimination toward classroom behaviors,
defined as the effect of in-class behaviors on test scores, conditional on the student proficiency in
the subject and other characteristics that teachers may be biased at. To motivate our estimable
equation, we assume a simple and intuitive statistical model for how test scores are defined. The
non-blind scores of student i in exam j and subject s are determined by the following function:
SNBijs = Pijs + vijs + ∆(Wijs),
where Pijs is student’s proficiency. This component reflects factors such as i
′s knowledge in
the subject s required by the exam j and his/her test-taking ability. The term vijs represents
idiosyncratic factors, such as luck or how the student was feeling on a particular day, that are
equal to zero in expectation. The term ∆(Wijs) represents potential bias by exam graders, who





where Bijs := (GBijs, BBijs) is a vector of student i’s classroom behavior in subject s computed
using only behavior reports that preceded exam j – in some specifications it is computed using
reports made by teachers from subjects other than s and by teacher from the previous year; Xij
includes ethnicity indicators (Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and White), gender, age, and
the past performance of student i in blind examinations;8 and ξijs include i’s characteristics
unobserved by the econometrician that teachers observe and may discriminate against.
We refer to Pijs as the test score that i would receive in expectation if there was no grading
bias. However, we only observe a noisy signal from it, coming from scores in examinations that
cover the same content of SNBijs , take place under very similar conditions, but are graded blindly
(SBijs), and, hence, are free of any kind of bias from the graders. We assume that
SBijs = Pijs + eijs,
where the error term eijs may not be necessarily idiosyncratic. As S
B
ijs could potentially measure
different skills, we can decompose
eijs = P̃ijs − Pijs + uijs,
where P̃ijs is the i’s proficiency required in the blindly-graded examinations and uijs is an
idiosyncratic noisy. To make explicit that potential biases could arise if both types of examination
8In our main specifications we control for the cumulative average performance in the blind examinations from
science, humanities, and languages. When not using IV, we also control for past performance in math.
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were to measure different abilities, we linearly project Pijs on P̃ijs:
Pijs = δP̃ijs + rijs,
so that rijs represents factors that are required only by the non-blindly graded examinations.
In a final step, as we pool the test scores from different examinations and classrooms, we
add to our main specification classroom-by-subject fixed effects (αcs) and exam fixed effects





′Xij + αcs + πj + εijs, (1)
where εijs := ξijs + rijs − δuijs + vijs. Our parameter of interest is the vector β. It measures
the effects of classroom behaviors on teacher-assigned test-scores, conditional on student’s
proficiency (proxied by SBijs), other characteristics that teachers may be biased at (Xij), and
exploring only within classroom variation (αcs). Its identification requires that we deal with
unobserved heterogeneity (ξijs + rijs) and measurement error in the blind scores (uijs).
We claim that, conditional on ethnicity, gender, age,9 and past blind scores, if there other
student characteristics available to teachers, varying systematically within the classroom, and
affecting their grading behavior, they are balanced between students with different in-class
behaviors. In particular, we are controlling for the characteristics the literature has shown
teachers may be biased against. Moreover, we show our main point estimates are stable in
specifications with and without controls for student characteristics, which may suggest that
omitted variable bias is not a major concern if selection on observables is informative about
selection on unobservables (Altonji et al., 2005; Oster, 2019).
We also assume that C(Bijs, rijs) = 0. We already discussed some particularities of our
design that may provide grounds for the plausibility of the assumption. Overall, we believe there
are no apparent systematic differences in the exam-taking environment that could interact with
i’s characteristics. Both the blindly and the non-blindly graded exams are school-level tests that
take place in the regular classes and are supervised by inspectors. Furthermore, both types of
exams are high-stakes and designed by the pedagogical sector to cover the same material, based
on a bank of questions. Our main concern is that, while the MEs are only multiple-choice, most
of the teacher-graded exams are a mix of multiple-choice and written questions. If subjective
questions require handwriting abilities not covered by the blindly-graded exams, correlated with
in-class behaviors, our identification strategy could not be valid. To investigate whether this
seems to be a potential concern, we make use of a reduced sample of schools where students
perform essays graded by an external team. Xu and Gong (2017) show that blindly-assigned
essay scores reflect grading biases toward handwriting quality. Therefore, we control for blind
essay scores in an attempt to control for students’ writing skills and potential grading biases
toward handwriting abilities. We find nearly identical results when adopting such strategy.
9As we exploit within classroom variation, age should capture students who are advanced or who have failed
previous years.
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Additionally, we show that essay teachers practice grading discrimination toward classroom
behavior. In this case, we are able to present evidence of grading biases in a setting where both
the blind and the non-blind exams have exactly the same format. Finally, to test if there is any
other difference between SEs and MEs correlated with behavior that could bias our estimates,
we additionally use the scores from the SEs that are blindly graded as placebo outcomes. In
particular, we show that such scores are not affected by student behaviors conditional on the
blind scores.
To tackle the measurement error problem, we use the lagged blind math score (LSBijs) as
an instrument for the current one. In the literature on grading discrimination, this is the same
strategy of Botelho et al. (2015). In the context of value-added models, simulations by Lockwood
and McCaffrey (2014) suggest that using lagged scores as instruments for the current ones can
eliminate the bias in treatment effects estimations when test scores used as regressores are
measured with error.10 Still, one might be worried about the validity of the exclusion restriction.
It might be, for example, that teachers practice statistical discrimination by using students’
past performance in blind math exams to reduce noise about their proficiency. The exclusion
restriction may be valid provided we adjust especially for past test scores in other subjects, and
also for pupil’s ethnicity, gender, age, classroom behavior, and classroom fixed effects. Otherwise,
it is likely that lagged blind scores would be correlated positively with the unobserved skills that
determine SNBijs . Under this scenario, we show in Appendix B that OLS and IV produce upper
and lower bounds for β. Due to test scores measurement error, the bias of the OLS estimator of
β is bounded away from zero. The intuition is that behaviors measure part of δ through the
correlation between behaviors and SBijs once δ is estimated with attenuation bias. Contrary, if
C(LSBijs, εijs) > 0, δ is overestimated by IV, and hence, β is estimated with attenuation bias.
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Anyway, when we estimate β by OLS and consider additional proxies for Pijs, we obtain upper
bounds that are close to the IV estimates. Additionally, we obtain very similar results if we
follow other papers from the literature and estimate a differences-in-differences specification,
which is equivalent to imposing the restriction δ = 1 in equation (1) so that we do not need to
deal with the measurement error problem.
Regarding inference, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and calculated with
student-level clusters. We also tested for school-level clusters and the standard errors remained
nearly identical.12 Additionally, in all our specifications, the test scores are standardized to a
10The authors propose several alternative methods based on the standard error of the test score – returned by
Item Response Theory (IRT) – to correct for the measurement error bias. As the school examinations we study
are not constructed using IRT, we can not use these methods. However, other papers that also use lagged scores
as instrument to correct for the measurement error report that doing so using the standard errors returned by
IRT leads to very similar results (Khwaja et al., 2011; Botelho et al., 2015). Another important finding by the
authors is that it is possible to mitigate the influence of test measurement error in OLS regressions by controlling
for multiple prior test scores. We also test such a specification by including in Xij past cumulative performance
in other subjects: language, science, and humanities.
11
C(LSBijs, εijs) > 0 if the lagged blind scores are correlated positively with the unobserved skills that
determines SBijs – C(LS
NB
ijs , ξijs + rijs) > 0 – and the measurement errors are not auto-correlated or the serial
correlation is lower in comparison to C(LSNBijs , ξijs + rijs).
12Appendix Table B1 presents this result.
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distribution with zero mean and a unit standard deviation. This procedure is applied within
subjects to each test separately. To facilitate reading of results, in our main specifications
Bijs stands for binary variables that indicate whether students are in the top quartile of the
behavior measures’ distribution. We also present the results using the continuous measures. To
avoid feedback effects, our behavior measures use only reports that preceded the teacher-graded
examinations. We also tested the reports students received in the previous year by teachers
that currently do not teach them.
3.2 Main Results
We begin by examining the association between behaviors and test scores. Table 2, column (1),
presents the unconditional OLS estimates. We can see that the average math grades of students
with bad in-class behaviors – BB(Pct.75) = 1 – are 0.42 standard deviation (SD) below those
such that BB(Pct.75) = 0. The unconditional grade gap between students with GB(Pct.75) = 1
and GB(Pct.75) = 0 is even greater: 0.65 SD in favor of the better-behaved pupils. As several
other non-cognitive indicators studied by the literature, our behavior measures strongly predict
pupil test scores. Of course, this does not imply directly that teachers are practicing grading
discrimination. If, for example, students with better in-class behavior are those who prepare
more for the tests, we should expect them to obtain higher grades.
Therefore, in column (2), we follow the empirical strategy previously outlined. We control
for the blind math scores, our proxy for the grades students would obtain if there were no
grading bias. To tackle the measurement error problem in our control variable we instrument
current blind scores with its lagged values.13 Under this specification, the behavior effects are
significantly reduced, indicating that a share of the competence differences seen by teachers is
captured by performance in the blindly-scored tests. Still, the behavior effects are significant
and high in magnitude, indicating that teachers discriminate student behaviors in grading. Our
results suggest that the better-behaved students have their grades inflated by 0.12 SD. This
amounts to 18 percent of the unconditional gap. Additionally, teachers seem to deduct, on
average, 0.16 SD from worse behaved students, which represents 38 percent of the unconditional
gap. Just to put it into perspective, a recent meta-analysis of field experiments in education
found that 70 percent of the treatment effects on math test scores produced by 314 RCTs
are lower than 0.16 SD (Kraft, 2020). Hence, grading biases toward classroom behavior may
produce similar effects from successful interventions in the educational domain. Additionally,
these biases produce a gap between students with different behavioral skills that, in our context,
amount to approximately 60 percent of the black-white achievement gap (0.23 SD).
Our results remain similar if we control for student demographics (column 3). Hence,
despite the vast literature showing grading biases toward boys and minority ethnic groups, they
are not relevant cofounders in our setting. In the Appendix C, we present evidence suggesting
13Reflecting the cumulative nature of student performance, past scores are strongly correlated with current
ones as it is suggested by the high first-stage F statistic. Additional first-stage summary statistics are available
upon request.
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discrimination against boys and black students, in line with evidence from the literature. Results
are, though, much weaker than the results we found for behavior. Additionally, we do not find
heterogenous effects according to these characteristics, making it unlikely that our results are
explained by teachers’ biases toward gender and ethnicity also reflected on the behavioral report.
Grade repetition is another characteristic that might influence teachers’ grading decisions. As
we explore only within classroom comparisons and our results are robust to the inclusion of
a set of age indicators, this does not seem to be a relevant cofounder either. Results are also
robust if instead of controlling for a set of age indicators, we add a covariate capturing age-grade
distortions. In column (4), we control for past blind scores in other subjects, which may proxy
for unobservable competences required only by the non-blindly graded exams. Finally, in
column (5), we follow the same specification of Botelho et al. (2015), which also correct for the
measurement error in language test scores, and consider higher-order polynomials for the blind
scores.14 In particular, a cubic polynomial for the blind math scores, a linear function of the
blind language scores, and the interaction between these. Under these specifications, the bad
behavior estimate reduces slightly, although the reduction is not statistically different from zero,
and the good behavior estimate remains the same.
Appendix Figure A.5 replicates our previous results for several other subjects. This is
consistent with other papers investigating teacher grading biases (Lavy, 2008; Hanna and Linden,
2012; Lavy et al., 2018). Additionally, previous evidence does not depend on our discretization
of the behavior measure. When we use other moments of the distribution and the continuous
measures, results reveal the same pattern (see Appendix D.1 for further results). We also
analyze the different behaviors separately. Disinterest during class seems to be the negative
behavior that influence teachers’ grading the most. Participation during the class seems to be
the most praised one (see Appendix D.2). Finally, we also use alternative data from a small
number of schools where students take regular courses aimed at improving their socio-emotional
abilities (more specifically, grit, creativity, cooperation, communication, pro-activity, and critical
thinking). The pattern of the results remain similar if we proxy students’ behavior skills using
the scores they earn in these courses: 35% of the unconditional correlation between non-cognitive
skills and scores on teacher-graded achievement tests seems to be mediated by grading biases
toward socio-emotional characteristics (for more details, see Appendix D.3)
Taken together, our results suggest that teachers unequally grade students’ academic
cognitive skills on the basis of their classroom behavior rather than performance. The estimated
grading biases are high in magnitude and affect students’ scores similarly to successful educational
interventions. Our results indicate that teachers’ discretion in grading may explain a significant
share of the positive association between non-cognitive characteristics and academic performance,
systematically reported by the literature.
14Instrumenting language scores may be especially important if one believes that language skills are required
only by the non-blind math scores.
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4 Robustness and heterogeneity
In this section, we conduct additional robustness checks and empirically assess alternative
explanations for our results.
4.1 Alternative estimators
As previously discussed, if the exclusion restriction of our IV estimator does not hold, then
we should expect that we underestimate the behavior effects. We then estimate equation (1)
by OLS to obtain upper bounds for the true discrimination parameter of interest β. Table 3
presents the results. In column (1), we replicate the same specification from Table 2, column
(2). The first thing to notice is that the relation between blind and non-blind scores estimated
by OLS (0.42) is much lower than the estimated by IV, reflecting the attenuation bias due to
test score measurement error. As a consequence, the behavior effects are higher when estimated
by OLS. Another major difference is that the inclusion of past scores in column (4) changes
significantly the magnitude of our estimates. The reason is that the past blind scores from other
subjects serve as proxies for part of the student proficiency signal, which mitigates the biases
from the estimated behavior effects (Lockwood and McCaffrey, 2014). This allows us to estimate
finer upper bounds for our parameter of interest. We also tried to reduce the biases even more
by using past math scores as control, instead of instrument, but the results remained virtually
the same (column 5). Overall, we highlight that the results estimated by OLS using additional
proxies for student proficiency (−0.17 and 0.20 for the BB and GB measures, respectively)
are close to the IV estimates (−0.14 and 0.12, respectively), and hence underestimation of β
does not seem to be a concern. Finally, column (6) also estimates equation (1) by OLS but
restricts δ to 1. In this case, our dependent variable becomes the difference between blind and
non-blind scores and we do not have to deal with test score measurement error. Results are
nearly identical those we obtain using IV.
4.2 Differences between blindly graded and non-blindly graded ex-
aminations
Our main empirical strategy relies fundamentally on the proximity between teacher- and blindly-
graded achievement tests, which we claim to be granted in our setting. Under the model outlined
in Section 3, δ represents the association between the skills required by both types of exam. The
estimated δ is not statistically different from 1 when we correct test score measurement error
using the IV strategy (Table 2, column 4). Such evidence gives empirical support to our claim.
Next, we exploit particular features of our setting to conduct empirical tests and heterogeneous
analysis that provide additional support to our study design’s internal validity.
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4.2.1 Placebo test
We argued previously in the text that there is no systematic difference between MEs and SEs in
the exam-taking environment that could interact with behavior and performance. Furthermore,
that the few apparent differences between them should not change the way we interpret the
results. Specifically, we believe that there should not be relevant cofounders associated with the
fact that SEs have a relatively higher weight in the course grades and that both exams are not
taken simultaneously. To provide evidence in favor of our assumptions, we conduct a placebo
test exploiting that the third and sixth SEs are blindly graded in most of the schools. More
precisely, we estimate the effects of positive and negative behaviors on the blindly-assigned SEs’
scores, conditional on the respective MEs’ scores. In this case, as both test scores come from
blindly graded examinations covering the same material, we do not expect behavior to have any
effect unless there are relevant differences between the two kinds of exams. Table 4 presents the
results. Supporting our claim, the correlations between bad (-0.2 SD) and good behavior (0.5
SD) and math test scores (column 1) vanish when we adjust for student proficiency measured
by blind scores (column 2).
4.2.2 Subjective questions
We believe the only cofounder not ruled out in the previous test is handwriting ability. One
might suspect that math teachers praise good handwriting when grading questions that require
written answers. If these skills correlate with behaviors, our estimates would be biased. To test
this hypothesis, we re-estimate our main results using a subsample of schools where students
perform blindly-graded essays, and then adjust for the blind essay scores to check whether
this seems to be an important confounder. This kind of examination, more than any other,
should capture abilities like those mentioned before. Appendix Table B2 presents the results. In
summary, we find nearly identical grading biases when we control for the essay scores, even if we
correct its measurement error by using lagged scores. We also use the blind essay scores to test
whether teachers from this subject practice grading discrimination toward student behaviors. In
this particular case, we were able to compare evaluations with exactly the same format. The
results we obtain for essay are very similar to those obtained when analyzing math scores (see
Appendix Table B3). Thus, we are confident that our main results are not biased due to writing
competencies praised by teachers in math achievement tests. This is further evidence suggesting
that the few differences between MEs and SEs do not explain the pattern of our results.
4.2.3 Timing of exams
The different timing of the MEs and SEs could, in theory, account for some of the gaps in
performance between students with different behaviors in the blindly and non-blindly graded
exams. For example, one could argue that while students with worse classroom behavior tend to
rest between the first and the second exam, those better behaved study. In this case, performance
in the blindly graded tests may not reflect precisely the students’ level of proficiency at the
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time they take the non-blindly graded tests, especially if the time gap is large. As for most
of the schools, the teacher-graded examinations take place after the MEs (Appendix Figure
A.6), this could explain the pattern of our results.15 Previous evidence on placebo outcomes
already suggest that different timing should not be a driver of our results. Still, as we have
timing heterogeneity in our data, we provide a further piece of evidence supporting this result.
Appendix Table B4 presents the results for two samples that differ on whether teacher-graded
examination take place before or after the blindly-graded ones. Appendix Table B5 exploits
variation in the intensive margin: in one sample the difference between the two types of exam is
less than 3 weeks; in the another one, the opposite is true. The estimated biases have the same
sign and are high in magnitude in all samples. These results suggest that the specific pattern in
the timing of the blind and non-blind exams is not the cause of the pattern in our main results.
4.2.4 Student ability
Our results may have a different interpretation if there are still facets of student cognitive
attributes affecting blind and non-blind scores differently, not ruled out by our previous robustness
tests. To shed light on this possibility, we follow Lavy (2008) and control for student unobserved
ability using academic performance in the previous school year. More specifically, we use the
average score in all blindly-graded tests made in 2018. Appendix Table B6 reports such results.
Our estimates remain remarkably similar when we include controls for math and language
ability. This evidence reinforces that our results are not driven by unobserved competencies
correlated with behavior required by only one type of examination.
4.3 Biases in the behavior reports
A potential concern in our setting is that behavior reports and test scores may have correlated
attribution errors. When sending a behavior report, teachers may miss-attribute it due to other
students’ characteristics and attitudes besides classroom behavior. If they also use the same
factors to discriminate test scores, our identification strategy would not be valid. We already
showed that our results are not heterogeneous across sub-samples that vary according to gender
and ethnicity, characteristics the literature has shown teachers may be biased against. Still,
there may be unobservables that teachers project on both test scores and behavior reports.
We then measure student classroom behavior by using the reports from teachers other
than the ones assigning math test scores. We first use the assessments made by all teachers
(“All Teachers”). We believe these depend less on the subjectivity of a teacher’s type, hence
capturing better student behaviors and not other unobservables that could also be factored into
test scores. We also test the sensibility of the results when we exclude the reports sent by the
15One could imagine several other mechanisms. Some, however, would not explain our results. For example,
if students with worse classroom behavior tend to study for the exam later than well-behaved pupils, perhaps
because they have a higher discount rate as suggested by the literature, than they might be better prepared for
the second exam than for the first.
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math teachers (“All Teachers – Math”).16 Finally, we exploit the fact that students do not have
classes with the same teacher for two straight years in our schools. As we have access to the 2018
behavioral data, we can then measure the students’ in-class behavior using assessments made in
the previous year, by teachers that currently do not even teach the students. Figure 3 presents
all the results. They remain remarkably similar across the behavior measures. Indeed, Appendix
Table B7 shows none of the five different ways of estimating behavior leads to differences that
significantly weaken our results. This may alleviate concerns with correlated attribution biases
on behavior reports and test scores. Still, we cannot rule out that several different teachers may
project the same students’ unobservables, available to teachers in both 2018 and 2019, in the
behavior reports and test scores.
4.4 Statistical Discrimination
Here we exploit data heterogeneity to test whether teachers’ grading behavior is consistent with
potential interpretations of statistical discrimination models.
4.4.1 Biases when ill-behaved students are skilled in math
Statistical discrimination arises if teachers use classroom behavior to predict students’ unobserved
ability based on beliefs they have on the proficiency of students with certain characteristics. The
question of whether such beliefs are based on real evidence or are unfounded is irrelevant to the
outcome of statistical discrimination. However, it is plausible to imagine that these beliefs may
be influenced by the superior average performance of students with better classroom behavior.
We explore heterogeneity in the performance of students in the blindly-graded examinations
to test whether the estimated biases are lower in a subsample of students where those with
worse classroom behaviors are as skilled as their classmates with better behaviors. To do so, we
select classrooms where in the first semester students with BB(pct.75) = 1 or GB(pct.75) = 0
performed, on average, better in the blind math exams than their classmates with BB(pct.75) = 0
or GB(pct.75) = 1, respectively. We call this subsample of sample A. The subsample where the
previous conditions are not satisfied is called of sample B. Appendix Figure A.7 shows that in
sample A, In sample B, there is a striking gap between these groups of students.
We believe those gaps should influence teachers’ information about students’ scholastic
ability. Directly, if teachers do observe the students’ performance in blindly-graded examinations,
or indirectly, if proficiency in mathematics captured by performance on those examinations
is correlated with performance in other outputs available to teachers during the year. Figure
4 presents the estimated biases for the full sample, sample A, and sample B. The estimates
are though higher within sample A, which is the opposite of what one should expect under
statistical discrimination based on unbiased beliefs. These results may suggest that this form of
discrimination is not explaining our results. Otherwise, teachers are not updating their beliefs
16We also tested the reports coming from all the other subjects separately. The results are very similar across
different subjects.
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based on the average performance of the math class they are grading.
4.4.2 Subjectivity in evaluation
According to Bohren et al. (2019), the level of subjectivity in evaluations provides some piece of
evidence that may help to disentangle sources of discrimination. More specifically, decreasing
the subjectivity of evaluations should mitigate statistical discrimination, as beliefs about group
statistics (e.g., the average scholastic ability across groups of students with different behaviors)
play a smaller role in assessing quality when signals of quality are more precise (i.e., there is less
subjectivity). Subjectivity should not affect preference-based discrimination, though, which will
persist even if quality is perfectly observable. In this paper, we found that classroom behavior
influence teachers’ ratings of cognitive skills in several subjects, ranging from math and science
to Portuguese and English (Appendix Figure A.5), and even essay (Appendix Table B3). We
expect the level of subjectivity to be different across these evaluations. As our results have low
heterogeneity within this dimension, teachers grading behavior in our data does not seem to be
consistent with statistical discrimination.
4.4.3 Learning across the school-year
We now explore dynamic predictions of statistical discrimination models. Bohren et al. (2019)
show that in settings where individuals repeatedly perform tasks that generate output, observing
sequences of evaluations from such tasks should mitigate statistical discrimination, which can
even be reversed if stemmed from inaccurate beliefs. Similarly, in the employer-learning model
(Altonji and Pierret, 2001), employers observe workers’ performance on the job and thus learn
about workers’ unobserved productivity. As they learn, they rely less on easily observed workers’
characteristics to predict their productivity. The faster employers learn, the shorter the period
during which firms statistically discriminate. In our setting, under statistical discrimination, the
more teachers observe their students’ performance at school, the less they should use classroom
behaviors to predict students’ proficiency.17
Exploring the fact that we observe teachers grading at least four examinations, we test
whether estimated biases decay throughout the year. When lagged blind scores are used as
instrument for the current scores, we lose information from the first exam. Additionally, the
subset of schools in which the third and sixth SEs are teacher-graded is too small, so we cannot
precisely estimate exam-specific grading biases for these cases. Then, Figure 5 presents the
results for the second, fourth, and fifth exams. The estimated grading bonus for well-behaved
students are remarkably constant across the year. The grading deduction from the ill-behaved
ones is lower in exam 2 and then remains similar across exams 4 and 5, which may indicate that
teachers take some time to identify students with bad behavior. Anyway, the results are the
opposite of what one would expect under our initial hypothesis. These evidence suggest that
17In the context of racial grading discrimination, Botelho et al. (2015) find that while there is a bias toward
black students attending classes with a teacher for the first time, no significant disparities are found among those
that have already had classroom with that teacher before.
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a model of statistical discrimination with learning does not seem to be explaining our results,
perhaps because teachers do not statistically discriminate, or because learning is slow in our
setting.
5 Estimating whether approval decisions are based on
student behavior
So far, we have documented that students’ in-class behaviors affect their scores in teacher-
graded achievement examinations through a channel other than the material’s knowledge
required in those tests. The estimated effect is high in magnitude and is not explained by
test score measurement error, differences between teacher-graded and blindly-graded exams,
and a potential simultaneity between non-blind scores and behavioral reports. These results
suggest that teachers may be influenced by how their pupils behave in class when scoring them
in achievement tests, which is explicitly prohibited by the schools’ rules. As shown in the
previous section, this grading behavior is systematic throughout the school year. Hence, it may
significantly affect students’ academic progress. In this section, we try to go one step further
and analyze if teachers also impose different standards for students in the final stage of the
schooling evaluation process, depending on how they behave in class. More specifically, we
study whether teachers may have discretion over the decision to approve students at the end of
the school year and whether such a decision prejudices/benefits students depending on their
classroom behaviors.
By our partner’s official guidelines, students who achieve an end-of-year grade above 60
move on to the next grade. Those that do not meet the approval cutoff should be reassessed.
This process is based on a reassessment examination that covers the entire content of the year,
worth 100 points, and takes place approximately two weeks after the students’ last examination.
A student in the reassessment phase is approved if the simple average of her final grade and
reassessment grade exceeds 50. However, in our data, several students with an end-of-year grade
below 60 receive the privilege of being approved without going through the reassessment phase
(see Appendix Figure A.8). After the last examinations of the second semester, teachers meet
to discuss their pupils’ performance. In most schools, teachers use these meetings to approve,
with no need for reassessment, students with a final grade between 40 and 60.18 There is no
official rule that determines which students can pass under these conditions. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that classroom behavior is a frequent argument used by teachers to justify their choices.
We wish to estimate whether this behavior does exist and is systematic.
By plotting the proportion of individuals taking the reassessment exam across end-of-year
grades and by in-class behavior status, Appendix Figure A.9 indeed suggests that ill-behaved
students are harmed while the well-behaved are benefited. To quantify this difference and exploit
18Those meetings are called conselho de classe (literally translated by class council) and they are very common
in Brazilian school setting.
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cleaner variation – conditional on other students’ characteristics and within the same grade
and school – we propose the following empirical strategy. We pool i’s end-of-year grades from




′Wi + ηl + λg + ψs + ǫis (2)
where Ris equals one if i took reassessment at subject s and zero otherwise (there is, if he was
approved without having to pass thorough the reassessment phase). Bi := (GBi, BBi) based on
all reports student i received. As the decision to place low-grade students into the reassessment
phase is taken together by teachers of different subjects, our behavioral measures use the reports
from all of them. Still, the results remain similar if we use subject-specific measures. Results
are also robust if we use the behavior assessments from 2018, made by teachers currently not
responsible for approval decisions. Wi is a vector including age-grade distortion, gender, and
ethnicity indicators. Finally, ηl, λg, and ψs are fixed effects for school, grade, and subject,
respectively. Our vector of interest is α, which measure the correlation between in-class behaviors
and the outcome of interest Ris among students with the same end-of-year grade, conditional
on a few demographics, and exploiting only within school and grade comparisons. Regarding
inference, standard errors are robust and clustered at the student level. As the estimation of α
exploits variation within very restricted cells, one might worry about over-rejection of the null
due to a potential low number of clusters within each behavior status. Following Ferman (2019),
we find that the assessment for a 5%-level test is less then 6% for each grade bin, for both good
and bad behavior indicators.19 This indicates that inference based on clustered-robust standard
errors at the student level is reliable.
Figure 6 plots our main estimates. Consistent with the pattern of results depicted in the
previous sections, well-behaved students are systematically favored, while the bad-behaved ones
are punished. The former are in a higher proportion approved without having to take one final
examination; the opposite is true for the latter. The effects are stronger for students with a final
grade closer to 60 (between 53 and 58). In this case, the point estimates indicate an increased
or decreased chance of going through reassessment of almost 10 p.p – 20% in comparison to the
rate of students going through reassessment within this range. Points estimates have a lower
magnitude at the bottom of the grades’ distribution as the outcome has very low variability in
this case. A summary parameter computed by the average (weighted by bin size) of the effects
across the grade bins indicates an effect of approximately 5 p.p for both groups. This represents
7% of the proportion of students taking reassessment within this sample. We do not find such
an effect for other student demographics (see Appendix Figure A.10). Overall, these results
indicate that teachers pose another obstacle to students’ progress because of their classroom
behaviors.
Even if our strategy fully control for the main determinant of reassessment and we
further adjust for student demographics and fixed effects, there may still be some unobservable
heterogeneity within each cell. In that case, the correlation we estimate may also measure the
19We consider iid standard normal variables in this assessment. Results are available under request.
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relation between Ris and unobservable characteristics (associated with in-class behavior) that
teachers may consider when deciding whether to approve low-grade students. We then follow
Oster (2019) and use the change of our estimates in specifications with and without controls
(including the fixed effects) scaled up by changes in the r-squared to see whether our results are
robust to unobserved heterogeneity.20 Instead of testing the stability of each grade-bin estimate,
we test the robustness of the average effect. Appendix Figure A.11 shows that there is a slight
reduction in the average effect for ill-behaved students when we adjust for student demographics
and fixed effects. The average effect of good behavior remains stable. Following Oster (2019)
(and her notation) we then assume that the r-squared of the model with covariates (R̃) would
increase 30% if we could further include the unobservable determinants of Ris in the model
(Rmax = 92% in our setting) and that the unobservable and observables are equally related to
the treatment (δ = 1). Using this parametrization, we estimate the bias-adjusted treatment
effect, depicted in Appendix Figure A.11 under the label “unobservables”. Overall, the estimates
would remain stable if we could control for unobserved heterogeneity. If we consider δ = 1 as an
upper bound scenario, the average effect of bad behavior on reassessment within the sample
that may receive the privilege of being approved without the final exam is within the interval
[0.032, 0.045]. The good behavior average effect would be within the interval [−0.04,−0.036].
These intervals would include the zero only if δ = 4 and δ = 10, respectively, which are very
unlikely situations.
6 Simulating how assessment biases affect grade reten-
tion
In the previous sections, we documented that there exist different layers of discrimination
against student behaviors. Test scores from several teacher-graded achievement examinations
overweight or underweight students’ knowledge in the subject depending on how they behaved
in class. They are also treated differently in approval decisions at the end of the year. We
now ask whether this teacher grading behavior affects grade retention probability depending on
the students’ behavior. To do so, we use our previous estimates and simulate counterfactual
scenarios where this grading behavior would affect retention mechanically by altering students’
end-of-year grades and their probability of going through the reassessment phase. Though, we
have in mind that this would be only a conservative scenario, as discriminatory grading behavior
may affect students’ outcomes through several other channels not measured here as distorted
self-perceptions (like reinforced beliefs of inferiority) and distorted perceived returns of human
capital investments by parents.
We begin by noting that in our setting the probability of being retained is given by
Pr(Retention = 1) = Pr(Retention = 1|Reassessment = 1) × Pr(Reassessment = 1).
20To do so, instead of estimating a regression for each grade bin, we estimate a satured model of Ris on grade
fixed effects ant its interactions with the other independent variables of model (2).
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Based on our main estimates from Section 3, we can correct or intensify teachers’ grading
biases toward classroom behavior to analyze how this affect Pr(Retention = 1) through distorted
final grades. Notice that end-of-year grade affects both Pr(Retention = 1|Reassessment = 1)
and Pr(Reassessment = 1) as it is the main determinant of reassessment, and it is also factored
into the scores that determine retention. Discriminatory attitudes toward classroom behavior
may also affect Pr(Retention = 1|Reassessment = 1) through other channels, such as grading
discrimination in the reassessment exams. However, as we do not have a clear design to
estimate such a bias, we consider a lower bound scenario in which the only channel by which
teachers’ biases toward behavior affect this term is through its effect on final grades. Our
current setting is a bit unusual as there are several high-stakes examinations graded blindly,
which minimizes the effects of teachers’ discretion when grading exams on students’ end-of-year
grades. Therefore, we simulate a more realistic baseline scenario where all test scores would be
affected by grading biases toward behavior (“non-blind setting”). Then, to analyze how grading
discrimination affects retention and reassessment, we simulate a scenario with no grading biases
toward classroom behavior (“blind setting”). In this case, we also remove leniency to approve
low-grade students based on classroom behavior, which directly affects Pr(Reassessment = 1).
Figure 7 plots our simulations on the probability of going through the reassessment phase.
Among the well-behaved students (panel a), the proportion taking the reassessment exam is
8.6%. Everything else constant, the proportion of well-behaved students in the reassessment
phase would be 1 p.p. lower if all tests were subject to grading manipulation. From here, if we
could eliminate grading discrimination and also teachers’ discretion on promotion decisions, the
proportion taking reassessment would increase 3.6 p.p., or 40% in relation to the fraction in the
current setting. The proportion of ill-behaved students (panel b) doing the reassessment exam
is much higher: 36.7%. Ceteris paribus, it would be 40.6% if all test scores were affected by
grading discrimination. We calculate that this fraction would decrease by one quarter (to 30%) if
there were no grading biases toward in-class behavior. Our simulations suggest that the level of
requirement imposed on students strongly depends on how they behave in the classroom. While
the difference in the likelihood of going through reassessment between good- and ill-behaved
students would be 33 p.p in the non-blind setting, it would be almost three fifths of this value
(19 p.p.) in the blind setting.
Figure 8 then depicts our simulations for the proportion of retained students. Comparing
the scenario in which all test scores were subject to grading bias to a scenario in which there is
no grading bias, we find that the proportion of well-behaved students falling the grade would
increase more than twice, from 0.17% to approximately 0.48%. Among the ill-behaved, the
retention probability would go from 6.4% to 3.6% if teachers were neutral to students’ classroom
behavior when evaluating their achievement. We conclude from these simulations that teachers’
discretion may impose or reduce significant barriers to students’ academic progress contingent on
their classroom behaviors. Teachers’ assessment practices may then explain part of the relation
between those non-cognitive characteristics and schooling variables, and even other important
life outcomes directly affected by grade retention (Manacorda, 2012; Eren et al., 2018).
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7 Conclusion
In this article, we empirically detect that teachers are not neutral to students’ behaviors when
assessing their aptitude and making high-stakes decisions based on that. When rating students’
performance on achievement tests, teachers overweight or underweight their scholastic cognitive
skills depending on how they behave in class. Approximately 20% (40%) of the unconditional
correlation between negative (positive) classroom behaviors and teacher-assigned scores seems to
be mediated by grading biases. These results are robust to the incidence of measurement error on
blindly-assigned scores used as regressors, differences between blindly- and non-blindly- graded
exams, student unobserved ability, and potential feedback effects between teacher-awarded
scores and behavior assessments. Heterogenous effects suggest that grading biases are unlikely
to result from statistical discrimination: they do not decrease in classes where the correlation
between behavior and ability is low; they are similar across evaluations with different levels of
subjectivity, such as an essay and a math test; and they are also similar across assessments
made at different points of the year, so there is no kind of learning.
We also find another stage of the academic evaluation process where teachers impose
different standards for students based on their classroom behavior. Conditional on end-of-year
grade, teachers’ decision to promote pupils below the passing cutoff grade is influenced by
their behaviors. The well-behaved ones are in a higher proportion approved without having to
take a reassessment examination. The opposite is true for the ill-behaved, which may have a
20% higher chance of going through a reassessment phase instead of being approved directly
by teachers. These results are robust to unobservable student characteristics that could also
influence teachers’ decisions. Finally, in counterfactual exercises, we find that teacher assessment
practices may significantly change the retention probability among students with different
classroom behaviors.
Taken together, our results are relevant to the understanding of educational gaps between
students with different behavioral characteristics. They indicate that teachers’ assessment
practices may impose or reduce obstacles to students’ acquisition of skills and educational
credentials depending on how they behave in class. From a policy standpoint, these results
go against the objectives sought by recent reforms in the United States that aim to improve
school evaluation systems, making them more standardized and fair (Feldman, 2018; McMillan,
2013). One of the measures proposed by these reforms is the complete separation of behavior
and achievement assessments. In our context, these are also the guidelines. There are formative
assessments of behavior and subjective ratings of overall student behavior. Still, teachers factor
in their pupils’ classroom behaviors into high-stakes decisions taken during the whole academic
year in such a way that is not consistent with official guidelines. Hence, it may be privately
optimal for them to use off-the-book channels to praise well-behaved pupils or punish those with
poor behavior. These results highlight the challenge of encouraging teachers to be completely
objective when giving an assessment. We left for future work to design and evaluate interventions
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Figure (1) Distribution of Non-blind Math Scores
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Note: These figures plot the distribution of non-blind math scores. Observations are at the student×exam level.
BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile
of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In panel (a), solid line represents students with BB(Pct.75) = 1
and the dotted line represents those with BB(Pct.75) = 0. In panel (b), solid line represents students with
GB(Pct.75) = 0 and the dotted line represents those with GB(Pct.75) = 1. All test scores are standardized (the
mean equals zero and the variance equals one).
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Figure (2) Association Between the Blind and Non-blind Math Scores
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Note: This figure plots the average of the blind and non-blind math scores across all examinations. The line fits
the data points by OLS. All test scores are standardized (the mean equals zero and the variance equals one).
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Figure (3) Estimated biases in the non-blind scores toward classroom behavior while using









































Note: This figure plots 95% confidence intervals computed with student-level cluster and point estimates
from student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, using different
behavior measures. Panels a and b report the estimated effects for GB(Pct. 75) and BB(Pct. 75), respectively,
which stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the behavior measures’
distribution. Results vary over whether measures use the reports coming from math teachers, teachers from all
subjects, or teachers from all subjects expect math; and whether they use the reports from current teachers
(2019) or past teachers (2018). All specifications follow Table 2, column 4.
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Figure (4) Estimated biases in classrooms where students with different in-class behaviors
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Full Sample Sample A Sample B
Note: This figure plots 95% confidence intervals computed with student-level cluster and point estimates from
student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned math scores from the second semester on classroom
behavior (measures use the reports from the first semester only), for different samples. Sample A selects
classrooms where in the first semester students with BB(pct.75) = 1 or GB(pct.75) = 0 performed, on average,
better in the blind math exams than their classmates with BB(pct.75) = 0 or GB(pct.75) = 1, respectively. The
subsample where the previous conditions are not satisfied is called of sample B. Full sample uses samples A and
B. All specifications follow Table 2, column 4.
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Note: This figure plots 95% confidence intervals computed with student-level cluster and point estimates from
student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, using subsamples
that are specific for each exam. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) stand for binary variables that indicate whether
students are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. All specifications follow Table 2,
column 4.
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Figure (6) Differential probability of going through the reassessment phase across the final
grade, by behavioral group
(a) Good Behavior
F-statistic:   4.62
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(b) Bad Behavior
F-statistic:   9.20
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Note: This figure estimates student i × subject s-level OLS regressions of a dummy indicating whether i had
to go through the reassessment phase in subject s on classroom behavior and additional controls, for each
final grade bin (of size 1) between 41 and 59. All specifications include controls for age, ethnicity, gender,
and fixed effects for school, grade, and subject. Panels a and b report the estimated effects for GB(Pct. 75)
and BB(Pct. 75), respectively, which stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top
quartile of the behavior measures’ distribution. These measures are computed using the assessments from all
teachers. Confidence intervals (95%) are computed with student-level clusters. The solid blue line represents the
average effect computed by a bin-size-weighted average of the grade-bin effects. The dashed blue lines represent
respective 95% confidence intervals.
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Current setting Non-blind setting Blind setting
Note: This figure simulates the proportion of students with good (panel a) and bad (panel b) behavior –
GB(pct.75) and BB(pct.75) – going through the reassessment phase under different counterfactual scenarios.
“Current setting” uses the original setting. “Non-blind setting” includes teacher grading biases toward behavior
in the blindly-assigned scores. “Blind setting” eliminates the influence of classroom behavior into grading and
approval decisions. Counterfactual grading scenarios are computed using the estimates from Section 3 and 5.
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Current setting Non-blind setting Blind setting
Note: This figures simulates the grade repetition rate among students with good (panel a) and bad (panel b)
behavior – GB(pct.75) and BB(pct.75) – under different counterfactual scenarios. “Current setting” uses the
original setting. “Non-blind setting” includes teacher grading biases toward behavior in the blindly-assigned
scores. “Blind setting” eliminates the influence of classroom behavior into grading and approval decisions.
Counterfactual grading scenarios are computed using the estimates from Section 3 and 5.
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Other (Yellow or Indigenous) 0.01 123
Behavior Data (all reports)
Classes with at least one good report 0.99
Classes with at least one bad report 0.98
Good reports 44.18 22187
Bad reports 11.51 22187
Good behavior measure 0.53 22186
Bad behavior measure 0.29 22020
Behavior Data (math reports)
Classes with at least one good report 0.84
Classes with at least one bad report 0.81
Good reports 10.20 17115
Bad reports 3.22 17115
Good behavior measure 0.47 17048
Bad behavior measure 0.25 16389
Note: This table reports summary statistics for our data. Except for
“Schools” and “Classrooms”, observations refer to the number of stu-
dents. Over-age indicates whether a student is two or more years older
than the official age for a specific grade.
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Table (2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES OLS IV IV IV IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.649 0.119 0.113 0.112 0.119
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.018)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.418 -0.159 -0.147 -0.139 -0.123
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)***
Blind Math Score 1.112 1.112 1.010 0.927
(0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.034)*** (0.103)***
Student Demographics No No Yes Yes Yes
Other Scores No No No Yes Yes
Instrumenting Language Scores - No No No Yes
High-Order Polynomials for Scores - No No No Yes
Number of Observations 36044 36044 36044 36044 36044
Number of Clusters 14692 14692 14692 14692 14692
First-stage F Statistic 4513 4343 1099 6.775
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (columns 2-5) regressions of teacher-assigned
math scores on classroom behavior. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) stand for binary variables that indicate whether
students are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In the IV estimates, lagged blind
math scores are used as instrumental variable for the current math scores. All specifications include classroom
fixed effects and exams fixed effects. Other scores include the cumulative average performance in science and
humanities, and current performance in language. High-order polynomials for scores include a third order polyno-
mial for blind math scores, and an interaction term between math and language scores. In Column 5, we also use
lagged language scores as instrumental variable for the current language scores. Controls include indicators for
age, gender, and ethnicity (Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and White). We also include a dummy for students
with missing data on ethnicity. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (3) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS - DID
GB (Pct. 75) 0.649 0.444 0.443 0.261 0.233 0.132
(0.017)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)*** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.015)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.418 -0.318 -0.321 -0.189 -0.171 -0.154
(0.015)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)***
Blind Math Score 0.429 0.423 0.210 0.161
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)***
Student Demographics No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Scores No No No Yes Yes Yes
Past Math Scores No No No No Yes -
Number of Observations 36044 36044 36044 36044 36044 36044
Number of Clusters 14692 14692 14692 14692 14692 14692
Adjusted R-squared 0.107 0.283 0.289 0.441 0.475 0.00735
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior
(columns 1-5). In column (6), the dependent variable is the difference between teacher-assigned and blindly-assigned math
scores. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the
math behavior measures’ distribution. All specifications include classroom fixed effects and exams fixed effects. Other scores
include the cumulative average performance in science and humanities, and current performance in language. Past math
scores include the lagged blind math score. Controls for ethnicity include 5 indicators: Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow,
and White. We also include a dummy for students with missing data on ethnicity. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust
and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (4) Estimated biases in the SEs’ blind scores
(1) (2)
VARIABLES OLS IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.497 0.033
(0.022)*** (0.022)
BB (Pct. 75) -0.211 -0.011
(0.021)*** (0.021)
Blind Math Score 0.804
(0.045)***
Number of Observations 16166 16166
Number of Clusters 10446 10446
First-stage F Statistic 633.5
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (columns
1) and IV (columns 2) regressions of math test scores from
blindly-graded specific exams on classroom behavior. Column
2 follows the same specification from Table 2, column 4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Figure (A.2) Empirical CDF of the Good Behavior (GB) and Bad Behavior (BB) Measures
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Note: This figure estimates the empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDF) of the behavior measures.
Panels a and b plot the ECDF of the bad and good behavior measures, respectively, computed using the
assessments made by all teachers. Panels c and d plot the ECDF of the bad and good behavior measures,
respectively, computed using only the assessments by math teachers.
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Figure (A.3) Empirical CDF of the good behavior (GB) and bad behavior (BB) measures, by
student demographics
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Note: This figure estimates the empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDF) of the behavior measures,
by student demographics. Over-age indicates whether a student is two or more years older than the official age
for a specific grade.
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Figure (A.4) Mean relationship between the subjective grades and the behavior measures
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Note: This figure plots binned scatterplots describing the mean relationship between the subjective grades and
behavior measures.
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Figure (A.5) Estimated biases in the non-blind scores from Mathematics, Portuguese, English,
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Note: This figure plots 95% confidence intervals computed with student-level cluster and point estimates from
student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned scores from several subjects on classroom behavior, and
proficiency in the material covered by the examination (measured by the blind scores,which we instrument using
lagged blind scores). Panels a and b report the estimated effects for GB(Pct. 75) and BB(Pct. 75), respectively,
which stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the behavior measures’
distribution. When the dependent variable is a math test score, we measure proficiency using the blind math
scores, and additionally control for past performance in blindly-graded science and language exams. When the
dependent variable is a Portuguese or English test score, we measure proficiency using blind language score,
and additionally control for past performance in blindly-graded math and science exams. When the dependent
variable is a teacher-assigned score in science, chemistry, physics, or biology, we measure proficiency using blind
science score, and additionally control for past performance in blindly-graded math and language exams. All
specifications additionally include controls for age, gender, ethnic indicators and fixed effects for classroom and
exam. Students from grades 6 through 9 do not have classes in chemistry, physics, and biology; only a science
class. The opposite is true for students from grades 10 through 11.
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Note: This figure estimates the density of the timing differences between the blind and non-blind math exams,
when we pool all the six exams.
48











-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Blind Math Score (z-score)












-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Blind Math Score (z-score)












-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Blind Math Score (z-score)












-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Blind Math Score (z-score)
GB (Pct. 75) = 1 GB (Pct. 75) = 0
Sample B
Note: These figures estimate the density of the blind math scores from the first-semester exams for students
whose behavior indicators assume different values, using two different samples. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75)
stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’
distribution. In the top two figures, solid line represents students with BB(Pct.75) = 1 and the dotted
line represents those with BB(Pct.75) = 0. In the bottom two figures, solid line represents students with
GB(Pct.75) = 0 and the dotted line represents those with GB(Pct.75) = 1. Sample A selects classrooms where
in the first semester students with BB(pct.75) = 1 or GB(pct.75) = 0 performed, on average, better in the blind
math exams than their classmates with BB(pct.75) = 0 or GB(pct.75) = 1, respectively. We call this subsample
of sample A. The subsample where the previous conditions are not satisfied is called of sample B.
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Note: This figure plots the proportion of students going through the reassessment phase across several final
grade bins. In our data, all students that do not go through the reassessment phase are promoted to the next
year.
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Figure (A.9) Probability of going through the reassessment phase conditional on end-of-year
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Note: This figure plots the proportion of students going through the reassessment phase across several final
grade bins, by different classroom behavior characteristics. GB = 1 (BB = 1) for students in the top quartile of
the good (bad) behavior measure distributions. In our data, all students that do not go thought he reassessment
phase are promoted to the next year.
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Figure (A.10) Differential probability of going through the reassessment phase across end-of-
year grade bins, by demographics
(a) Girl
F-statistic:   0.50
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F-statistic:   1.10
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(c) Over-age
F-statistic:   1.07

















41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59
Grade Bin
Note: This figure estimates student i × subject s-level OLS regressions of a dummy indicating whether i had
to go through the reassessment phase in subject s on student demographics and additional controls, for each
final grade bin (of size 1) between 41 and 59. All specifications include controls for classroom behavior and
fixed effects for school, grade, and subject. Panels a, b, and c report the estimated effects for binary variables
indicating whether i is girl, white, or in age-grade distortion. Confidence intervals (95%) are computed with
student-level clusters. The solid blue line represents the average effect computed by a bin-size-weighted average
of the grade-bin effects. The dashed blue lines represent respective 95% confidence intervals. This figure also
presents the F-statistic (and respective p-value) from a joint hypothesis test under the null that all grade-bin
estimates equal zero.
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No covariates Observables Unobservables
Note: This figure uses the estimates from student i ×subject s-level OLS regressions of a dummy indicating
whether i had to go through the reassessment phase in subject s on end-of-year grade bin fixed effect, classroom
behavior indicators, additional controls (indicators for ethnicity, gender, and age-grade distortion), and fixed
effects for school, grade, and subject, and the interaction between end-of-year grade bin fixed effects with the
other variables from the model. “No covariates” plots the average effect (weighted by end-of-year grade bin size)
of behavior indicators across the end-of-year grade bins in a model with no additional controls and fixed effects.
“Observables” plots such an aggregation from a model with additional controls and fixed effects. “Unobservables”
plots bias-adjusted treatment effects following Oster (2019) and her rule of thumbs for parametrization. 95%
confidence intervals are computed using a bootstrap. BB and GB stand for binary variables that indicate whether
students are at the top quartile of the behavior measures’ distribution.
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GB (Pct. 75) 0.649 0.112
(0.024)*** (0.015)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.418 -0.139
(0.022)*** (0.016)***
Blind Math Score 1.010
(0.034)***
Number of Observations 36044 36044
Number of Clusters 72 72
First-stage F Statistic 903.9
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. Column 2 follows the same specifica-
tion from Table 2, column 4, except for the standard errors
that here are calculated with school-level clusters.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior while
controlling for handwriting ability
(1) (2) (3)
IV IV IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.096 0.091 0.087
(0.018)*** (0.018)*** (0.018)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.130 -0.121 -0.120
(0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)***
Blind Math Score 1.026 1.011 1.029
(0.032)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)***
Essay Scores No Yes Yes
Instrumenting Essay Scores - No Yes
Number of Observations 28338 28338 28338
Number of Clusters 12432 12432 12432
First-stage F Statistic 1168 1140 579.1
Note: This table reports student×exam-level IV (columns 1-3) regressions of
teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior, in a subsample where essay
scores are available. Column 1 follows the same specification from Table 2, col-
umn 4. Column 2 additionally controls for blind essay scores, and column 3 uses
lagged essay scores as instrumental variable for the current ones.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B3) Estimated biases in the non-blind essay scores toward classroom behavior
(1) (2)
VARIABLES OLS IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.406 0.210
(0.024)*** (0.025)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.369 -0.166
(0.023)*** (0.025)***
Blind Essay Scores 0.682
(0.029)***
Number of Observations 15861 15861
Number of Clusters 6319 6319
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 3) regressions of teacher-assigned essay scores
on classroom behavior, for two different subsamples. One of
them uses all the essay exams, and the other is restricted to es-
say scores that are high-stakes. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75)
stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are
at the top quartile of the essay behavior measures’ distribution.
All specifications include classroom fixed effects and exams
fixed effects. Covariates additionally include indicators for age,
gender, and ethnicity (Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and
White). Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clus-
tered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B4) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior while
varying the timing differences between the exams
(1) (2)
VARIABLES IV IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.122 0.126
(0.031)*** (0.018)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.119 -0.146
(0.028)*** (0.016)***
Blind Math Score 1.052 0.951
(0.060)*** (0.039)***
Order of the exams Blind first Non-blind first
Number of Observations 11294 27833
Number of Clusters 4512 12469
First-stage F Statistic 374.1 793.5
Note: This table reports student×exam-level IV (columns 1-2) re-
gressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior,
for two different subsamples according due to timing differences be-
tween the realization of the blind and non-blind exams. In column 1
(2), blindly-graded tests came first (after) the teacher-graded ones.
All columns follow the same specification from Table 2, column 4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B5) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior while
varying the timing differences between the exams (intensive margin)
(1) (2)
VARIABLES IV IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.097 0.113
(0.023)*** (0.017)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.141 -0.140
(0.020)*** (0.015)***
Blind Math Score 0.941 1.012
(0.046)*** (0.034)***
Timming difference < 3 weeks > 3 weeks
Number of Observations 18723 36273
Number of Clusters 14398 14838
First-stage F Statistic 598.3 1090
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column
1) and IV (columns 2-5) regressions of teacher-assigned math
scores on classroom behavior, for two different subsamples ac-
cording due to timing differences between the realization of the
blind and non-blind exams. Column 1 (2) uses exams where
the absolute difference varies less (more) than three weeks. All
columns follow the same specification from Table 2, column 3.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (B6) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior while
controlling ability
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV IV IV IV
GB (Pct. 75) 0.108 0.112 0.108 0.111
(0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.025)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.139 -0.142 -0.141 -0.143
(0.025)*** (0.023)*** (0.024)*** (0.023)***
Blind Math Score 1.034 0.907 0.986 0.908
(0.059)*** (0.076)*** (0.061)*** (0.076)***
Math Ability No Yes No Yes
Language Ability No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 14140 14140 14140 14140
Number of Clusters 5565 5565 5565 5565
First-stage F Statistic 367.7 210.3 333.1 210.3
Note: This table reports student×exam-level IV (columns 1-4) regressions of teacher-assigned
math scores on classroom behavior. Column 1 follows the same specification from Table
2, column 4; but restrict the sample to data available in both 2018 and 2019. Column 2
(3) additionally control for math (language) ability measured by the average scores in all
blindly-graded math (language) exams from past year. Column 4 controls for both math and
language ability.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
59
Table (B7) Testing whether the estimated biases in the non-blind scores toward classroom
classroom behavior are statistically different under different ways of measuring behavior
Good Behavior Bad Behavior
Diff P-value Diff P-value
Math 2018 0.03 0.32 0.00 0.91
All Subjects 2019 0.02 0.48 -0.02 0.42
All Subjects 2018 0.03 0.30 0.00 0.97
All Subjects - Math 2019 0.03 0.32 -0.01 0.57
All Subjects - Math 2018 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.35
Note: This table tests whether the estimate plotted in Figure 3, panel a (or
b), under the label Math 2019 is statistically different from all the others
presented within the same panel. More specifically, we test whether using
the behavior reports from the math teacher from the past year, from all
teachers from current or past year, or from all teachers from current or past
year expect the math ones, lead to statistically different results than simply
using the behavior assessments made by current math teachers. Diff is the
observed difference between the coefficients. P-value is a boostrapped p-value
from tests under the null that Diff equals zero.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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B OLS and IV Potential Biases
We consider a simple econometric model to analyze the bias of the OLS if the blind test score is
measured with error, and of the IV estimator when the exogeneity assumption of the instrument
does not hold. For simplicity, we assume that all variables have expected value equal to zero,
we consider only the measure of good behavior, and we suppress the ijs sub-index. A simplified
version of equation (1) is then given by
SNB = βGB + δSB + ε, (3)
where ε = ξ + r − δu+ v. We assume that E[GBε] = 0, but E[SBε] is potentially different from
zero. Following the discussion from Section 3, we consider the case in which r ≈ 0, so that
E[SBε] 6= 0 because of the measurement error u. We also assume that ξ is uncorrelated with
GB and SB.
Assuming that u is uncorrelated with all other variables in the model, we have that the




























where σ2x = var(GB), σ
2
w = var(S
B), σ2u = var(u), and σxw = cov(GB,S
B). If we define the

















so the sign of the bias of the OLS estimator for β is determined by the signs of σxw and δ. Given
model (1), we have that δ > 0. Moreover, we can estimate σxw using the data, where we find
σ̂xw > 0. Therefore, we should expect that β̂
ols is upward biased. The intuition is that the
measurement error u implies that the estimator for δ will suffer from attenuation bias, which
implies that it will not completely control for students’ skills. If we consider instead our measure
of bad behavior, then the correlation between BB and SB is negative, which implies that the
estimator associated with BB would be downward biased.
We consider next estimation of equation (3) using lagged blind test score LSB as instru-
mental variable for SB. This instrument clearly satisfies the relevance condition. If E[LSBε] = 0,
then the IV estimator would be consistent for β. We are worried, however, that the exogeneity
condition for the instrument may not be valid. We assume that E[LSBu] ≈ 0, which is a
standard assumption in classical test theory and applied papers (e.g., Bond and Lang (2018)).
Still, it may be that E[LSBξ] > 0. For example, teachers may statistically discriminate students
based on their past performance in blind scores or other correlated unobservable signals of























where σwz = cov(LS
B, SB) and σxz = cov(LS
B, GB). Note that σ2xσwz − σxwσxz = cov(e1, e2),
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where e1 is the population error in the linear projection of GB on S
B, and e2 is the population
error in the linear projection of GB on LSB. If we consider the residuals from a regression of
GB on SB and the residuals from a regression of GB on LSB, then the correlation between
these two residuals is positive, which provides evidence that σ2xσwz − σxwσxz is positive. Given
that σxw > 0 when we consider a measure of good behavior, if we have E[LS
Bu] ≈ 0 and
E[LSBξ] > 0, then β̂IV would be downward biased. Likewise, if we consider a measure of bad
behavior, then the estimator associated with this variable would be upward biased.
Combining these results, we have that the discrimination parameters are bounded by the
OLS and the IV estimators.
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C Racial and Gender Discrimination
Table C1 presents the estimated bias in the non-blind math scores toward black pupils. Blacks’
average non-blind scores are 0.23 SD below than whites’ (column (1)). This gap falls drastically
(-0.077, s.e. 0.042) when we adjust for student proficiency captured by blind scores. Our
estimates have relatively higher magnitude in comparison to Botelho et al. (2015) and are
very similar to Hanna and Linden (2012). The first also find grading biases that harm black
pupils in a Brazilian sample with a high share of black students by contrasting teacher-assigned
end-of-year grades and state proficiency scores. The second uses data from India and, in a
correspondence study design, find grading biases toward students’ caste.
In Table C2, we present the estimated grading bias toward gender. Boys have advantages
of 0.03 SD over girls in math test scores. This could indicate some favoritism toward boys.
However, by controlling for non-blind math grades we find evidence that boys’ math proficiency
is under-assessed by teachers. The grading bias is equivalent to a taxation of 0.08 SD in blind
scores. Our main estimate drops significantly when we control for student in-class behaviors,
reflecting the fact that boys have worse classroom behavior, but remains statistically different
from zero. These findings are in line with previous studies using a similar research design (Lavy,
2008; Falch and Naper, 2013).
Taken together, our results indicate that despite suggestive evidence of grading biases
against boys and black students, results are much lower in comparison to biases toward behavior.
Additionally, we do not find any heterogeneous effects across race and gender. Finally, Figure
C.1 shows we also find grading biases against boys and black students in other subjects.
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Table (C1) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores against black pupils
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV IV IV
Black -0.235 -0.077 -0.075 -0.089
(0.048)*** (0.042)* (0.041)* (0.049)*
GB (Pct. 75) 0.112 0.107
(0.017)*** (0.020)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.140 -0.135
(0.015)*** (0.018)***
Black x GB 0.086
(0.095)
Black x BB -0.009
(0.098)
Blind Math Score 1.045 1.010 1.010
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
Number of Observations 36044 36044 36044 36044
Number of Clusters 14692 14692 14692 14692
First-stage F Statistic 1162 1098 1097
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (columns 2–4) regres-
sions of teacher-assigned math scores on ethnicity. Black stands for a binary variable that
indicates whether student is black. We also control for other ethnic indicators. The omit-
ted category is white. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) stand for binary variables that indicate
whether students are at the top quartile of the math behavior measures’ distribution. In the
IV estimates, lagged blind math scores are used as instrumental variable for the current math
scores. Columns 2-4 also controls for past blind scores of language, science, and humanities.
All specifications include classroom fixed effects and exams fixed effects. Standard errors in
parenthesis are robust and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (C2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores against boys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV IV IV
Boy 0.033 -0.080 -0.054 -0.052
(0.015)** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** (0.016)***
GB (Pct. 75) 0.112 0.121
(0.017)*** (0.020)***
BB (Pct. 75) -0.139 -0.145
(0.015)*** (0.022)***
Boy x GB -0.023
(0.026)
Boy x BB 0.010
(0.028)
Blind Math Score 1.045 1.010 1.010
(0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.034)***
Number of Observations 36044 36044 36044 36044
Number of Clusters 14692 14692 14692 14692
First-stage F Statistic 1163 1099 1098
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (columns 2–4) and IV (column 2) regres-
sions of teacher-assigned math scores on gender. BB(Pct.75) and GB(Pct.75) stand for
binary variables that indicate whether students are at the top quartile of the math behavior
measures’ distribution. In the IV estimates, lagged blind math scores are used as instrumen-
tal variable for the current math scores. Columns 2-4 also control for past blind scores of lan-
guage, science, and humanities. All specifications include classroom fixed effects and exams
fixed effects. Standard errors in parenthesis are robust and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Figure (C.1) Estimated biases in the non-blind scores from Mathematics, Portuguese, English,
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Note: This figure plots 95% confidence intervals computed with student-level cluster and point estimates from
student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned scores from several subjects on indicators for boys and
black students, and proficiency in the material covered by the examination (measured by the blind scores,
which we instrument using lagged blind scores). When the dependent variable is a math test score, we measure
proficiency using the blind math scores, and additionally control for past performance in blindly-graded science
and language exams. When the dependent variable is a Portuguese or English test score, we measure proficiency
using blind language score, and additionally control for past performance in blindly-graded math and science
exams. When the dependent variable is a teacher-assigned score in science, chemistry, physics, or biology, we
measure proficiency using blind science score, and additionally control for past performance in blindly-graded
math and language exams. All specifications additionally include controls for age, classroom behavior, other
ethnic indicators (the omitted category is white) and fixed effects for classroom and exam. Students from grades
6 through 9 do not have classes in chemistry, physics, and biology; only a science class. The opposite is true for
students from grades 10 through 11.
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D Further Exploiting Behavior Data
D.1 Alternative moments of the distribution and continuous mea-
sures
The results presented in this paper are based on a discretization of the behavior measures. One
might be worried whether our evidence depends strongly on this transformation. Table D1
presents similar results when we use other moments of the distribution. Moreover, Tables D2
and D3 depict a similar pattern when we use the continuous measures. The first presents the
results when we use compute the measures using the behavior assessments from the previous
cycle only. The second uses the accumulated reports. The share of the association between
behaviors and test scores explained by grading biases remains very similar to our main results:
20% for the good behavior and 40% for the bad behavior. Finally, we also obtain similar results
when using the overall number of good and bad assessments as regressors (see Table D4).
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Table (D1) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IV IV IV IV
GB (Pct. 50) 0.598 0.147
(0.017)*** (0.018)***
BB (Pct. 50) -0.348 -0.107
(0.016)*** (0.016)***
GB (Pct. 90) 0.766 0.099
(0.025)*** (0.026)***
BB (Pct. 90) -0.545 -0.187
(0.024)*** (0.025)***
Blind Math Score 1.029 1.057
(0.038)*** (0.039)***
Number of Observations 25085 25085 25085 25085
Number of Clusters 14686 14686 14686 14686
First-stage F Statistic 498.8 505.8
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (columns 1 and 3) and IV (columns 2
and 4) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on classroom behavior. BB(Pct.50) and
GB(Pct.50) stand for binary variables that indicate whether students are above the median
of the math behavior measures’ distribution. BB(Pct.90) and GB(Pct.90) stand for binary
variables that indicate whether students are above the 90th percentile of the math behavior
measures’ distribution. Columns 2 and 4 follows the same specification from Table 2, column
4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (D2) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using







Blind Math Score 0.965
(0.041)***
Number of Observations 21804 21804
Number of Clusters 12641 12641
First-stage F Statistic 734.7
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. BB and GB stand for the math behav-
ior measures, computed using the behavior assessments from
the previous cycle. Column 2 follows the same specification
from Table 2, column 4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (D3) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using







Blind Math Score 0.993
(0.034)***
Number of Observations 36044 36044
Number of Clusters 14692 14692
First-stage F Statistic 1079
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. BB and GB stand for the math be-
havior measures, computed using all the behavior assessments
that preceded the math exam. Column 2 follows the same
specification from Table 2, column 4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (D4) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward classroom behavior – using
the number of behavior assessments
(1) (2)
VARIABLES OLS IV
Ln GB Reports 0.345 0.090
(0.009)*** (0.009)***
Ln BB Reports -0.211 -0.057
(0.008)*** (0.008)***
Blind Math Score 1.018
(0.034)***
Number of Observations 38461 38461
Number of Clusters 15553 15553
First-stage F Statistic 1102
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1)
and IV (column 2) regressions of teacher-assigned math scores
on classroom behavior. Ln BB reports and Ln GB reports
stand for the natural logarithm of the number of bad and good
behavior assessments received by math teachers plus 1. Col-
umn 2 follows the same specification from Table 2, column 4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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D.2 What are the behaviors driving the results?
Here we estimate heterogeneous effects for each of the behaviors. To do so, we calculate
dis-aggregated behavior measures. Take the behavior report “Dedication” as an example. Let
dijs indicate the number of assessments i received under this category by a subject s teacher
until exam j. The measure Dedicationijs is then defined as:
Dedicationijs :=
dijs
max{dhjs : h ∈ C(i)}
.
Figure D.1 presents our main estimates. In panel (a), we estimate the grading biases
toward each of the behaviors separately. Overall, the point estimates are very similar, indicating
that they are all capturing correlated biases. In panel (b), we estimate the effects using the same
regression model. The negative discrimination is driven by the disinterest of students during
the class (-0.12, s.e. 0.026) and is followed by ‘Did not complete the required tasks’ (-0.054,
s.e. 0.024), and cellphone use (-0.025, s.e. 0.014). The positive discrimination is driven by
participation during the class (0.1, s.e. 0.026), and is followed by dedication (0.07, s.e. 0.026),
and good interaction with classmates (0.03, s.e. 0.025).
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Note: These figures plots student×exam-level IV regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on measures for
each classroom behavior. Panel (a) plots point estimates from different IV regressions on each behavior. Panel
(b) plots point estimates from an IV regression on all the behaviors. Both also plots 95% confidence intervals.
All regressions follow the same specification from Table 2, column 4.
73
D.3 Socio-emotional assessments
For a subset of our schools, students take a regular course designed to improve six socio-emotional
abilities: grit, creativity, cooperation, communication, pro-activity, and critical thinking. During
the course, pupils learn about daily habits that should lead them to better understand a
particular socio-emotional ability, reflect on it, and finally act according to it. Classes are guided
by games, projects, and audiovisual content, created by our partner specifically for this course.
The bulk of the material is a teen series that brings important themes to classroom discussions.
In each class, students discuss socio-emotional skills through the series’ characters’ habits and
challenges.
In this course, there are no formal examinations. Still, students also earn scores. They
are evaluated through projects within their material and in-class activities. We standardize
the assessments from each cycle and use it as a measure of non-cognitive abilities. Figure D.2
plots how much of the average socio-emotional score’s variability is explained by a linear model
on the behavior measures, cognitive skills measured by the average score on blindly-graded
achievement tests, and both the behavioral and cognitive components. The behavior measures
explain a high proportion of the socio-emotional score’s variance: 30%. The predictive power
of the cognitive skills is smaller: 9%. Moreover, after controlling for student behaviors, the
effect of cognitive abilities becomes negligible. Hence, the socio-emotional score reflects students’
non-cognitive characteristics highly correlated with in-class behaviors.
We then follow the empirical strategy outlined in Section 3, but use the socio-emotional
factor to capture student behaviors. To compute the socio-emotional score, we use only the
assessments that preceded each teacher-graded math examination. Table D5 presents the results.
One SD increase in the socio-emotional score is associated with increased teacher-assigned test
scores of 0.25 SD (columns 1). When we control for the cognitive skills measured in those tests
(column 2), the socio-emotional effect is significantly reduced. Further controlling for student
demographics (column 3) and other cognitive abilities measured by performance in other blind
exams (column 4) barely change the results. Overall, moving the socio-emotional score by one
SD produce a test score bonus of 0.084 SD when achievement exams are graded by teachers.
This represents 35% of the unconditional correlation. Table D6 shows the results do not change
if we measure socio-emotional abilities using the scores students earned in the previous year by
a different set of teachers. Taken together, these results reinforce the point that teachers factor
in non-achievement factors when assessing their students’ cognitive abilities in achievement
examinations.
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Behavior Measures Cognitive Skills Behavior + Cognitive
Note: This figure plots the adjusted R-squared from different linear regressions where the dependent variable
is the socio-emotional score. In the first model, the explanatory variables are the behavior measures. In the
second, cognitive skills measured by the average of all the blindly-assigned test scores. In the third one, we add
both the behavior measures and the cognitive skills.
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Table (D5) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward socio-emotional abilities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV IV IV
Socio-emotional score 0.247 0.095 0.086 0.084
(0.016)*** (0.013)*** (0.014)*** (0.014)***
Blind Math Score 1.023 1.023 1.015
(0.023)*** (0.023)*** (0.057)***
Student Demographics No No Yes Yes
Other Scores No No No Yes
Number of Observations 9902 9902 9902 9902
Number of Clusters 3411 3411 3411 3411
First-stage F Statistic 2062 1956 381
Note: This table reports student×exam-level OLS (column 1) and IV (columns 2-4) regres-
sions of teacher-assigned math scores on socio-emotional skills. Socio-emotional score stands
for the standardized assessments students received in coursers designed to improve their
non-cognitive skills in a period that preceded the exam. In the IV estimates, lagged blind
math scores are used as instrumental variable for the current math scores. All specifications
include classroom fixed effects and exams fixed effects. Other scores include the cumula-
tive average performance in science and humanities, and current performance in language.
High-order polynomials for scores include a third order polynomial for blind math scores,
and an interaction term between math and language scores. Controls include indicators for
age, gender, and ethnicity (Black, Indigenous, Pardo, Yellow, and White). We also include
a dummy for students with missing data on ethnicity. Standard errors in parenthesis are
robust and clustered at the student level.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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Table (D6) Estimated biases in the non-blind math scores toward socio-emotional abilities –
using the assessments received in the current and past year
(1) (2)
VARIABLES IV IV
Socio-emotional score (19) 0.095
(0.024)***
Socio-emotional score (18) 0.095
(0.029)***
Blind Math Score 1.117 1.120
(0.112)*** (0.112)***
Number of Observations 3184 3184
Number of Clusters 1075 1075
First-stage F Statistic 112.8 112.5
Note: This table reports student×exam-level IV (columns 1–2)
regressions of teacher-assigned math scores on socio-emotional
skills. Socio-emotional score (19) is computed as in Table D5.
Socio-emotional score (18) is computed using the assessments
students received in the socio-emotional course taken in the past
year. Columns 1–2 follow the same specification from Table D5,
column 4.
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; *p < 0.1.
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